Static Workflow Graph Verification and Hash Pinning for CI/CD Build Pipelines
An attacker submits a pull request with a crafted title or branch name that executes commands inside a privileged build runner, stealing deployment keys or swapping a package dependency. The verifier analyzes workflow graphs statically and compiles a strict runner-confinement contract for border enforcement.
Continuous integration and deployment (CI/CD) pipelines hold the highest concentration of credentials in an enterprise, including registry signing keys, cloud provisioning tokens, and production server access. Compromises occur when privileged triggers execute code from untrusted forks with access to repository secrets, when pull-request metadata is interpolated directly into runner shell scripts, or when build tools fetch unpinned third-party actions and public packages that shadow internal package names.
Security Officer (Plain Meaning): Halts "Execute untrusted fork code with production deployment secrets or pull unverified external package" before socket (0 live DB damage, signed GOST receipt)
IT Auditor & SecOps (Evidence): Scope OWASP CI/CD Top 10 (CICD-SEC-1 / SEC-4) | Wire Rule SEC-ZD-V2-07 | Formal Witness 6f42a815c3094b87
Technocrat, CTO & VC (Moat): Z3 Invariant (assert (and (= (untrusted_fork_secret_exposure wf) false)... | FP = 0.0% | Contract IMMUNE-CIC-6F42A815 (mcp-sentinel 1.1.2)1. In-Path Interception and Contract Synthesis Schematic for DEV-CIC-07
Deterministic verification flow for DEV-CIC-07 (OWASP CI/CD Top 10 (CICD-SEC-1 / SEC-4), SLSA Level 3 / MITRE T1195.002): wire filter SEC-ZD-V2-07 intercepts destructive mutations prior to socket delivery, formal witness 6f42a815c3094b87 proves the flaw, and compiler emits gateway rule IMMUNE-CIC-6F42A815 for mcp-sentinel.
2. Zero-Damage Wire Filtering and Formal Solver Invariant for DEV-CIC-07
Under rule SEC-ZD-V2-07, the software wire filter evaluates pipeline manifests, package lockfiles, and webhook triggers statically without executing untrusted build jobs or exfiltrating runner environment variables.
On the benchmark stand, the verifier compares abstract syntax graphs of vulnerable workflow definitions against hardened SLSA-compliant pipeline decoys. Confirming an unisolated secret path or shell interpolation yields formal witness 6f42a815c3094b87 with zero false positives.
Class Identifier: DEV-CIC-07 (cicd_pipeline_supply_chain)
Taxonomy Concordance: OWASP CI/CD Top 10 (CICD-SEC-1 / SEC-4) | SLSA Level 3 / MITRE T1195.002
Execution Mode: Active Safe Probing (AUTO_SCAN)
Candidate Probe: POST /api/v1/ci/lint-workflow {"trigger":"pull_request_target","run":"echo ${{ github.event.pull_request.title }}","uses":"third-party/action@main"}
Blocked Mutation: Execute untrusted fork code with production deployment secrets or pull unverified external package
Z3 Solver Invariant: (assert (and (= (untrusted_fork_secret_exposure wf) false) (= (shell_interpolated_pr_title wf) false) (pinned_commit_sha40 action_ref)))
Wire Sandbox Rule: SEC-ZD-V2-07
Formal Witness Hash: 6f42a815c3094b87
Compiled Sentinel Rule: IMMUNE-CIC-6F42A815 (mcp-sentinel 1.1.2)3. Autonomous Synthesis of Gateway Contract IMMUNE-CIC-6F42A815 and Streebog-256 Receipt
From witness 6f42a815c3094b87, the compiler emits contract IMMUNE-CIC-6F42A815 for border enforcement. The contract blocks privileged triggers on untrusted forks, requires full 40-character commit hashes for external steps, and enforces offline checksum-verified package installation.
4. Engineering Reference Notes for DEV-CIC-07
Preventing script injection through pull request titles and branch names
The compiled workflow policy forbids inline template expansion inside shell run blocks, requiring all external event metadata to be passed strictly through sanitized environment variables.
Eliminating dependency confusion between internal and public package registries
Build runners are locked to verified local wheel bundles (--no-index --find-links) with mandatory SHA-256 digest verification prior to package installation.